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A Note on Technology Shocks and the 
Great Depression
ROBERT INKLAAR, HERMAN DE JONG, AND REITZE GOUMA
The role of technology shocks as a driver of the Great Depression is the topic 
of our own earlier work and the paper by Watanabe in this issue. While the two 
studies differ in their data and assumptions, they complement each other and 
strengthen the conclusion of both papers: technology shocks were not the driving 
force of the Great Depression.
The article by Shingo Watanabe (2016) analyses whether technology shocks—the prime driver of business cycles in Real Business Cycles 
(RBC) models—could have set off the Great Depression, adding to a 
recent discussion in this JOURNAL. In line with our own work (Inklaar, de 
Jong, and Gouma 2011), he concludes that an appropriately constructed 
technology series does not have the positive relationship with factor 
inputs that is required for RBC models to hold true.
His article and ours are inspired by the work of Susanto Basu, John G. 
Fernald, and Miles S. Kimball (2006), who analyse the same question 
(“are technology shocks contractionary?”) and we each reach the same 
conclusions as Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (BFK) did for the post-WWII 
period. However, compared with the “gold standard” of BFK, analysing 
the pre-WWII period requires compromises, for instance, regarding 
the data. In our article, this led us to analyse biennial census data on 
gross output and inputs for 19 manufacturing industries for the 1919–
 SHULRG ZKLFK SUHFOXGHG XV IURP DQDO\VLQJ DQQXDO ÀXFWXDWLRQV
Watanabe (2016) used annual value added data for the private non-farm 
sector for the period 1892–1996, which requires more restrictive assump-
tions regarding technology. Neither empirical setting matches BFK’s 
annual industry-level data which covered the entire non-farm sector after 
WWII, but taken together the article of Watanabe (2016) and our own 
(Inklaar, de Jong, and Gouma 2011) present a compelling case against 
RBC models of the Great Depression.
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Although Watanabe (2016, p. 924) argues that our results “may be 
partly due to coincidence,” we would argue that the criticisms raised do 
not warrant such a drastic assertion and that, instead, the two articles 
should be seen as providing convincing and complementary evidence. 
Comparing the empirical analyses, Watanabe argues that we should 
have run a weighted regression and excluded oil prices as an instrument. 
Yet both changes would have led to a fairly modest increase in the esti-
PDWHGUHWXUQWRVFDOHIURPWRZLWKQRHIIHFWRQRXU¿QGLQJV1
Another criticism is that the change in his (non-farm sector) technology 
series is differently signed than in our (manufacturing) technology series 
in many periods. However, there are very few years in which the sign 
of non-farm technology change can be determined with (statistical) 
FRQ¿GHQFH :DWDQDEH)LJXUH DQGQR FRPSHOOLQJ UHDVRQZK\
the signs should match in the two different sectors. The argument that 
we should have been able to recover an (effectively) one-year negative 
response of technology on hours worked with biennial data is even less 
convincing.2
$ ODUJHU GLVFXVVLRQ LV ZKHWKHU RXU VSHFL¿FDWLRQ OHWV XV DGHTXDWHO\




At the same time, in his analysis, Watanabe has to resort to stringent 
DVVXPSWLRQVDERXWSURGXFWLRQWHFKQRORJ\VSHFL¿FDOO\WKDWLQWHUPHGLDWH
inputs and factor inputs are used in strict proportion. Such an assumption 
has been repeatedly rejected in the literature, including in our work when 
ZHGHPRQVWUDWHWKHELDVLQFRHI¿FLHQWVZKHQHVWLPDWLQJRXUSDUDPHWHUV
in a value added rather than a gross output framework (Inklaar, de Jong, 
and Gouma 2011, p. 847 and Online Appendix Table 8).
It is not hard to come away from this discussion with a sense of disap-
pointment about the quality of the data available to hold this debate. 
However, we would offer a more optimistic conclusion, namely that 
whatever the shortcomings in the analyses, they are apparently not crit-
ical to the central argument of these two articles. And the fact that two 
1 Details available on request, or easily estimated from the online dataset to our article.
2 In a regression of technology z on hours worked h, the parameter of interest is G1 in β β β≡ = +
−
h h− dh dz dzlog( )t t t t t1 2 1− 3 2−t  ZKLFK ZDV VLJQL¿FDQWO\ QHJDWLYH LQ %). 7KH
same equation, lagged one year is β β β= +
−
dh dz dzt t− tt−1 1 2 2 3 3. The biennial nature of 
our data means that dxt and dzt are not observed, but rather d d )−( +x xt t 1  and d d )−( +z zt t 1 . This 
means that G1 FDQQRW EH LGHQWL¿HG XVLQJ ELHQQLDO GDWD DGGLQJ XS WKH WZR HTXDWLRQV OHDGV WRβ β β β β β=d d dz( )+
−
x + +t tx t t1 1 1 2 3 2t 3 3−t .
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studies, each with its own limitations, comes to the conclusion that tech-
nology shocks did not drive the Great Depression should certainly be 
considered scholarly progress.
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